Cases, Regulations, and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 2 | Number 13 Article 2
7-5-1991
Cases, Regulations, and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1991) "Cases, Regulations, and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 2: No. 13, Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol2/iss13/2
110                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Agricultural Law
    Digest
taxable year in which the taxpayer first elects to report
loans as income15
For loans redeemed the same year, the courts are
divided–
•  The Fifth Court of Appeal, in the 1963 case of
Thompson v. Commissioner,16 held that no income was
realized from the loan allocable to a crop that was redeemed
in the same taxable year.  The court stated —
"§ 77 does not prescribe that the loan is income.  It
prescribed that it should be 'considered as income' and
when so done, the method of computing income so
adopted shall be adhered to...."
•  By contrast, the Ninth Court of Appeal in United
States v. Isaak 17 has held that the loan is income even
though redeemed the same year.  The court noted that the
loan itself is the taxable event.  Interestingly, the court in
Isaak made no mention of Thompson v. Commissioner 1 8
that was decided five years earlier.
If a CCC loan is treated as income and the commodity
is redeemed and sold in a later year, the IRS position is
that the excess above the amount reported into income
initially is taxable as ordinary income.19  One court treated
the additional gain on later sale as long-term capital gain
because of taxpayer intent to hold the commodity for
investment.20
As to the timing of income from loans, a loan is
income when the funds are received, not when the check is
mailed, if the taxpayer is on the cash method of
accounting.21
For generic commodity certificates, if CCC loans are
treated as income the gain on loan redemption using
certificates is applied as a basis reduction in the
commodity and thus is income in the year the commodity
is ultimately sold.22  Thus, the gain on loan redemption is
not necessarily reported in the year of the transaction that
is the outcome if CCC loans are treated as loans.23
Rather, the gain from using a generic commodity
certificate to reduce a CCC loan (in a so-called PIK and
Roll transaction) where the loan is treated as income is
deferred until the commodity is later sold.
FOOTNOTES
1 See 11 Harl, Agricultural Law
ch. 91 (1991).
2 Id. ch. 90.
3 7 C.F.R. § 1421.19(a).
4 7 C.F.R.  § 1421.23(d).
5 I.R.C. § 77.  See 4 Harl, supra note
1, § 27.03[5].
6 I.R.C. § 77(a).
7 Rev. Rul. 60-211, 1960-1 C.B. 35.
See DeHaven v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.
935 (1961).
8 IR 86-175, Dec. 31, 1986.
9 Rev. Rul. 87-103, 1987-2 C.B. 41.
For a detailed discussion, with
examples, of so-called "PIK and
Roll" transactions, see 4 Harl, supra
note 1, § 27.03[4][c][i].
1 0 I.R.C. § 77(a).
1 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.77-2(a).
1 2 Id.
1 3 I.R.C. § 77(b).
1 4 Ltr. Rul. 8819004, Jan. 22, 1988.
1 5 Rev. Rul. 56-358, 1956-2 C.B. 99.
See Ltr. Rul. 8906050, no date
given (extension of time allowed to
file election to change accounting
method to treat CCC loan amounts
as loans where taxpayer's
accountant forgot to timely file
Form 3115).
1 6 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963), aff'g
and rev'g, 38 T.C. 153 (1962).
1 7 400 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1968).
1 8 See note 16 supra.
1 9 Rev. Rul. 80-19, 1980-1 C.B. 185.
2 0 Asmussen v. U.S., 603 F. Supp.
60 (D. S.D. 1984).
2 1 Sloper v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 746
(1942).
2 2 Rev. Rul. 87-103, 1987-2 C.B. 41.
2 3 See note 8 supra and accompanying
text.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES.  The plaintiff was injured by falling off a
horse owned by the defendant while the plaintiff and
defendant were riding the horse.  Both parties were
intoxicated at the time.  The court held that the defendant
was not liable for the injuries because (1) the plaintiff
failed to show any dangerous propensities in the horse, (2)
the plaintiff assumed the risk of falling after remounting
the horse after a previous fall from the horse, and (3) the
defendant did not owe the defendant any additional duty of
care because of the plaintiff's intoxication.  Forrest v .
Gilley, 570 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
BANKING
BREACH OF CONTRACT.  The debtors had an
oral agreement with a bank under which the bank would
lend money for their farming operation and the debtors
would use the bank as their sole lending institution and
would abide by the bank's determinations and business
directives after semiannual reviews of the farm operations.
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After one such review, the bank required the debtors'
mother to guarantee a portion of a loan and agreed to
extend credit for farming expenses.  The bank issued a
cashier's check to the debtors but when the check was
submitted for cashing, the bank applied the amount to the
debtors' loans.  The court held that the debtors had pled
sufficient facts to support an action against the bank, but
not the president or directors individually, for breach of
oral contract to extend credit.  Hecker v. Ravenna
Bank, 237 Neb. 810, 468 N.W.2d 88 (1991).
The debtors were farmers who sought long-term
financing of their nursery operation from the defendant
PCA.  However, after three years, the PCA required either
substitute financing or increased payments on the loan
principal.  Because the nursery plants were still young, the
business was not profitable enough to make the increased
payments and the debtors were eventually foreclosed upon
by the PCA.  The debtors asserted affirmative defenses
including the PCA's violation of the Farm Credit Act.
The court held that the Farm Credit Act did not provide a
private right of action to enforce its provisions.  The court
did allow the affirmative defenses which alleged breach of
contract and statutory and common law duties unrelated to
the Farm Credit Act.  The court upheld the dismissal of
the debtors' affirmative defense of the PCA's breach of
fiduciary duty where the dealings between the parties were
at arm's length and the PCA did not take an active role in
the management of the debtors' operation.  Interstate
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. MacHugh, 810 P.2d 5 3 5
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  As part of a divorce decree,
the debtor was awarded the marital residence and the debtor
was required to pay the former spouse a specified sum
which was secured by a lien on the residence.  After the
debtor filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor claimed the
residence as an exempt homestead and sought avoidance of
the former spouse's lien as a judicial lien impairing the
homestead exemption under Section 522(f)(1).  The court
held that because the judicial lien attached at the same time
as the debtor's interest in the attached property arose, the
lien was not avoidable under Section 522(f)(1) which
applies only to judicial liens which attach to pre-existing
property interests of the debtor.  Farrey v. Sanderfoot,
111 S.Ct. 1825 (1991), rev'g  899 F.2d 5 9 8
(7th Cir. 1990), aff'g 92 B.R. 802 (E.D. W i s .
1988), rev'g  83 B.R. 564 (Bankr. E.D. W i s .
1988) .
The former spouse of the debtor had obtained a
judgment against the debtor which later attached to the
debtor's residence when the debtor purchased a
condominium.  Under the Florida exemptions, the debtor
was not allowed an exemption for an interest in a
homestead which was subject to a pre-existing lien.  After
the debtor declared bankruptcy, the debtor sought to avoid
the lien as impairing the homestead exemption.  The
former spouse argued that the exemption was not impaired
because the exemption was limited by the Florida
exemption statute, not the lien.  The court held that the
state limitation on the exemption could not be used to
defeat the Section 522(f)(1) avoidance provision.
However, the court, citing Farrey v. Sanderfoot, supra,
remanded the case to determine whether the lien attached
simultaneously with the debtor's acquisition of the
condominium and thus would not be avoidable under
Section 522(f)(1).  Owen v. Owen, 111 S.Ct. 1 8 3 3
(1991), rev'g and rem'g 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir .
1989), aff'g  86 B.R. 691 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Although the debtor listed an IRS claim on the
bankruptcy schedules, no claim was filed by the IRS or
debtor.  The debtor brought a proceeding under Section 506
to determine the amount of the IRS claim which was
secured, in order to avoid any unsecured portion of the
claim.  The court ruled that the debtor could not institute a
Section 506 proceeding where no claim was filed by the
IRS or debtor.  The court noted that had a claim been filed,
the avoidance of the unsecured portion of the lien would be
allowed in a Section 506 proceeding.  In re  Dembo,
126 B.R. 195 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtor operated
a grain storage facility and acted as a broker of grain owned
by third parties and stored in the facility.  The debtor,
however, sold much of the grain and failed to pay the
owners but paid the proceeds pre-petition to a creditor with
a secured loan against the facility.  The trustee filed an
action for turnover of the amounts paid to the creditor
which came from the improper sale of the grain belonging
to others.  The court held that the action was improper
because the grain proceeds did not belong to the debtor and
thus would not be part of the bankruptcy estate if turned
over by the creditor.  In re  Haynie Grain Services,
Inc., 126 B.R. 208 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor's interest in a
mandatory Section 401(k) ERISA employee retirement
plan was not included in estate property because the plan
was a spendthrift trust.  In re  James, 126 B.R. 3 6 0
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991).
The debtors claimed as exempt, under the Missouri
exemption for wages, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 525.030(2), excess
withholding taxes refunded by the IRS.  The court held
that the excess amounts lost their character as wages when
withheld and were not exempt as wages when refunded.  In
re  Wallerstedt, 930 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1991).
The debtor's interest in a retirement plan was not a
spendthrift trust, under Missouri law, where the debtor was
fully vested in the plan and could receive all benefits upon
termination of employment.  The debtor's interest in the
plan was exempt, under Missouri law, because the amount
in the plan was reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and spouse.  In re Hentzen, 126 B.R. 6 0 0
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991).
Mississippi has enacted provisions prohibiting
Mississippi residents from using the federal exemptions
and allowing residents the use of only the Mississippi
state exemptions in bankruptcy cases.  Miss. Code §
85-3-2 (eff. July 1, 1991).
SALE OF COLLATERAL.  During the appeal of
a decision awarding a creditor bank with a priority security
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interest in the debtor's farm equipment, the bank and the
SBA, another secured creditor, agreed to allow the
equipment to be sold at public auction with the proceeds
placed in escrow until the appeal of the decision was
decided.  The bank was the successful bidder at the auction
and placed the amount of its bid in the escrow account.
The bank then resold the equipment at a separate auction
and received $14,000 more for the equipment than the bank
paid for it.  After the SBA was awarded a priority security
interest by the appellate decision, the SBA sought recovery
of the extra $14,000 on three theories: (1) a fiduciary duty
on the part of the bank, (2) sale of the collateral not in a
reasonable commercial manner, and (3) the priority of the
SBA lien in the equipment.  The court held that (1) the
sale agreement placed no duty on the bank to account for
any profit on the sale of the equipment, (2) the sale of the
collateral was proper and the SBA had sufficient notice and
opportunity to purchase the equipment, and (3) the SBA
lien entitled it only to a prior interest in the escrow
account and not in any subsequent sale by the successful
bidder.  In re  Whatley, 126 B.R. 231 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 1991).
  CHAPTER 11  
LIEN DISCHARGE. The FmHA had two
undersecured claims against the Chapter 11 debtor rancher,
one secured by real property and one secured by chattels,
but neither lien was cross-collateralized.  The FmHA made
the Section 1111(b) election and voted to confirm the plan
which provided two cash payments to satisfy the Section
1111(b) election and two schedules for payment of the two
secured claims.  The debtor paid off the chattel secured
claim and the two Section 1111(b) cash payments and
sought release of the lien against the chattels.  The FmHA
argued that the chattel lien should remain to secure the
remaining secured claim payments.  The court held that the
secured claims were separate and once the Section 1111(b)
election requirements were satisfied (as defined by the plan
provisions), the lien securing a separate claim would be
released upon full payment of the claim where the claims
were not cross-collateralized.  In re Cook, 126 B . R .
575 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1991).
  CHAPTER 12  
INTEREST RATE.  The debtors had obtained three
limited recourse operating loans from the FmHA with
below market interest rates.  The Chapter 12 plan proposed
to make deferred payments on these loans at the weighted
average interest rate of the loans.  The court held that the
FmHA was entitled to a current market interest rate under
Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii).  The court briefly discussed the
issue of whether the current market rate was limited to the
rate the FmHA could expect to receive from the sale of the
property to local farmers, rather than a general market rate,
because the FmHA could be required to sell the collateral
to local farmers.  The court remanded the determination of
the interest rate to the district court.  In re  Fisher, 9 3 0
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1991).
TRUSTEE FEES .  The court held that the
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion to require
Chapter 12 plan payments of impaired claims to be made
through the trustee and made subject to the trustee's fees.
In re  Fulkrod, 126 B.R. 584 (Bankr. 9th Cir .
1991) .
  CHAPTER 13  
CLAIMS.  One of the claims against the Chapter 13
debtor's residence was an undersecured claim for home
improvement work.  The court held that the claim could be
bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims under Section
506(a).  The court also held that the terms of the
obligation which formed the secured portion of the claim
could not be modified by the plan but the unsecured
portion could.  In re  Franklin, 126 B.R. 7 0 2
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991).
ELIGIBILITY.  Appearing pro se, the debtor filed
the Chapter 13 schedules and listed one creditor's claim as
secured but after obtaining counsel, that claim turned out
to be unsecured thus increasing the amount of unsecured
claims above the $100,000 limit for Chapter 13 cases.
All parties to the case signed a stipulation that the original
schedules had been filed in good faith.  The court held that
the actual amount of unsecured claims as of the date of the
petition controls for determining eligibility for Chapter 13
and not the schedules filed in good faith by the debtor.
The court acknowledged, but refused to follow, the contra
authority of In re Pearson, 773 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1985).
Lucoski v. I.R.S., 126 B.R. 332 (S.D. Ind.
1991) .
The debtor had filed and completed a Chapter 7 case in
which a mortgage against the debtor's farm was discharged
as to the debtor's personal liability.  Because the mortgage
survived as against the property, the creditor foreclosed
against the property after the close of the Chapter 7 case
and obtained an in rem judgment against the property.  The
debtor then filed a Chapter 13 case, listing the judgment as
a claim against estate property.  The court held that the in
rem judgment was a claim subject to Chapter 13
rescheduling.  In re  Johnson, 126 B.R. 1 0
(yellow) (S. Ct. 1991), rev'g  904 F.2d 5 6 3
(10th Cir. 1990), aff'g 96 B.R. 326 (D. Kan.
1989) .
Note: The following case has been
effectively overturned as authority by the
above Supreme Court case.  The debtor had filed and
completed a Chapter 7 case in which two mortgages
against the debtor's residence were discharged.  The debtor
then filed a Chapter 13 case and listed the amounts due
under the mortgages as claims.  The court held that such
claims were not allowed claims in Chapter 13 cases and
the case would be dismissed.  In re  Neal, 126 B . R .
730 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1990).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS FOR
TAXES .  The debtors' Chapter 13 plan provided for a
schedule of deferred payments on tax claims based on
several years' of unpaid taxes, penalties and interest.  The
court held that the Chapter 13 plan must provide for
payment of the tax assessments in chronological order.  In
re  Divine, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 2 7 3
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
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DISCHARGE.  The IRS filed a claim against the
debtor for the assessment of the Section 6672 100 percent
penalty for failure, as a responsible person, to withhold
and pay employment taxes.  The court held that the debtor
was not discharged from the Section 6672 penalty because
the penalty was a tax and not a penalty.  In re  Garrett,
126 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  Prior to the debtor's filing
for Chapter 13, the IRS levied against two bank accounts
for the debtor's children for which the debtor acted as
trustee.  The Bankruptcy Court had held that the IRS levy
was proper because the debtor had made deposits and
withdrawals as if the accounts belonged to the debtor, but
the court had held that the levied accounts were bankruptcy
estate property because the debtor retained an interest in the
accounts.  The District Court reversed, holding that where
an IRS levy is made against cash or cash equivalents, the
debtor's rights in that property are extinguished and the
property is not included in a bankruptcy estate in a
subsequently filed case.  In re Brown, 126 B.R. 7 6 7
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY.  The Chapter
7 debtor claimed a California $30,000 exemption in the
homestead.  The trustee sold the homestead and the debtor
received $30,000 of the proceeds as exempt property.  The
IRS ruled that because under the California exemption, the
debtor was entitled only to a set monetary amount from
the proceeds of the sale of the homestead and not the
homestead itself, the gain realized on the sale of the
homestead was taxable solely to the bankruptcy estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9122042, March 4, 1991, revoking
Ltr. Rul. 9017075, Jan. 31, 1990 (see Vol. 1, p.
120 supra).
SECURED CLAIM.  The court held that the value
of the debtor's residence was decreased by the hypothetical
costs of sale for purposes of determining the secured
amount of a federal tax lien where the debtor planned to
retain the residence and the residence did not produce any
income.  In re  Coby, 126 B.R. 593 (D. N e v .
1991) .
ENVIRONMENT
CATTLE FEEDLOT.  The defendants operated a
cattle feedlot which disposed of waste into six holding
ponds.  A series of heavy rains overfilled the ponds and
waste was discharged into a creek. The plaintiffs filed suit
for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act for discharges
of waste without a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit.  The trial court
dismissed the suit for lack of standing, finding that no
violations had occurred at the time of suit or thereafter.
The trial court had found, however, that the defendant's
system would still allow it to discharge pollutants in the
event of less than a 25 year, 24 hour storm event.  The
appellate court held that because the defendant's system
was not able to meet the 25 year, 24 hour storm event
standard, the system was a point source pollutant required
to obtain an NPDES permit.  Because the defendant had
not obtained a permit or met the 25 year, 24 hour storm
event exception, the defendant was in continual violation
of the Clean Water Act at the time of the suit and the
plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit.  Carr v. Alta





ADULTERATED MEAT.  The defendant was
convicted of selling adulterated ground beef under 21
U.S.C. §§ 601(m)(3), 610, 676(a).  The defendant was a
meat buyer for a meat wholesaler and was charged with
reselling the meat after the meat was returned from
customers as unfit for human consumption.  The meat was
decomposed, rotten, gassy, bloated and sour smelling.  The
defendant argued that the statutes were unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the term "adulterated" so as to violate
due process.  The court held that the term "adulterated" was
not unconstitutionally vague.  In addition, the court held
that the defendant's sale of the meat "as is" did not excuse
the defendant from the violation of the statutes.  U.S. v .
Agnew, 931 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1991).
COMMUNITY LOANS .  The FmHA has issued
proposed regulations to allow applicants for community
and business programs guaranteed loans to be placed in a
pending status where guarantee authority is unavailable
when the application is filed.  56 Fed. Reg. 28351
(June 20, 1991).
DISASTER PAYMENTS .  The ASCS has
adopted as final regulations implementing the disaster
assistance program for 1990 soybeans, sugar beets,
peanuts and sugarcane.  56 Fed. Reg. 25345 (June
4, 1991).
The CCC has issued interim regulations implementing
the disaster assistance program for producers of
nonprogram crops who cropped more than once on the
same farm in 1989 in counties declared disaster areas due to
hurricane Hugo.  56 Fed. Reg. 26761 (June 1 1 ,
1991) .
EXPORT PROGRAMS .  The CCC has issued
interim regulations revising the regulations for the Export
Credit Guarantee Program, adding provisions of FACTA
1990.  56 Fed. Reg. 25998 (June 6, 1991).
HORSES .  The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations revising the procedures to be followed by
Designated Qualified Persons in conducting inspections at
horse shows, exhibitions, sales and auctions.  These
revisions affect changes made by final rules issued in
October 1990.  56 Fed. Reg. 26042 (June 6 ,
1991) .
LABOR HOUSING.  The FmHA has adopted as
final regulations changing the Farm Labor Housing
program to allow retired or disabled farm laborers to
occupy housing financed under the program if the housing
is not needed by active laborers.  56 Fed. Reg. 28469
(June 21, 1991).
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS.  The plaintiffs' 1989
farm operating plans were approved by the county
114                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Agricultural Law Digest
committee.  The plaintiffs produced evidence that the
national ASCS office was pressured by a member of
congress to overturn the approval of the plan because the
plan would have resulted in over $1.4 million in program
payments due to the organization of the plaintiffs' farm
operations to allow a large number of "persons" for
payment limitation purposes.  The national ASCS office
then ordered the Deputy Administrator for State and
County Operations (DASCO) to overturn the county
committee approval of the plan and to rule the plaintiffs
ineligible for 1990 and 1991 farm program benefits on the
basis that the plaintiffs had participated in a scheme or
device to evade the payment limitation provisions.  The
court held that the evidence demonstrated (1) impermissible
congressional interference with agency actions, (2) the
futility of requiring further administrative review, and (3)
the ASCS violation of its own administrative appeal
procedures.  The court ordered reinstatement of the
plaintiffs' 1989 farm plan and ordered either approval of the
1990 farm plan or, if not approved, appeal of the denial
only to the state ASC committee.  DCP Farms v .
Yeutter, 761 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. M i s s .
1991) .
PACA .  In a disciplinary hearing, the respondent
produce buyer decalred bankruptcy with $272.277.85 owed
to produce sellers.  The ALJ found that the failure to pay
these sellers constituted repeated and flagrant violations of
the PACA and order revocation of the respondent's licence.
IN an appeal to the Judicial Officer, the trustee of the
bankruptcy case joined the respondent inarguing that the
revocation of the respondent's licence would decrease the
liklihood of payment to the sellers because the respondent
would not be able to earn income to pay the debts.  The
JO rejected the argument for leniency on the grounds that
the deterent effect on other licencees would be greatly
diminished.  In re  Charles Crook Wholesale
Produce and Grocery Co., 48 Agric. Dec. 5 5 7
(1989) .
PRICE SUPPORT-SUGAR .  The CCC has
issued proposed regulations implementing the price
support program for the 1991 through 1995 crops of sugar




ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES .  The
decedent's estate included the decedent's interest in a QTIP
trust which had a business as part of the trust assets.  The
IRS ruled that trust expenses incurred before the decedent's
death and paid by the decedent's estate were deductible
administrative expenses.  Similarly, post-death estate costs
attributable to settling the estate affairs as to the trust were
deductible administrative expenses.  However, post-death
trust administrative expenses and the costs associated with
the business were not deductible administrative expenses.
Ltr. Rul. 9121002, Jan. 18, 1991.
The taxpayer established a revocable trust funded with
the decedent's separate and community property.  The
taxpayer held a general power of appointment over the
trust corpus.  Under state law, the taxpayer's interest in the
trust was subject to the claims of the taxpayer's creditors.
The IRS ruled that if the taxpayer's estate properly elects
installment payment of estate tax, the interest on the
deferred payments would be deductible administrative
expenses, including interest accruing after the period of
limitations for assessments against the estate.  Ltr. R u l .
9123024, March 8, 1991.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The surviving
spouse received from the decedent a life income interest in
trust proeprty which was eligible for the marital deduction
as QTIP.  At the death of the surviving spouse, the trust
property passed to a further trust with ten percent of the
net fair market value of the trust to be paid to the children
for life.  The remainder of the trust passed to a charitable
organization.  The IRS ruled that the estate of the
surviving spouse could take a charitable deduction for the
present value of the remainder of the trust passing to the
charitable organization.  Ltr. Rul. 9122029, Feb.
28, 1991.
DISCLAIMERS.  The taxpayer and the decedent
were partners in two farm partnerships, one of which
owned the farmland and the other operated the farm.  The
decedent held general and limited partnership interests and
the taxpayer and children held limited partnership interests.
After the decedent's death, the taxpayer and other limited
partners elected the taxpayer as the new general partner
with some of the taxpayer's limited partnership interest
converted to general partnership interests.  The election
also caused the decedent's general partnership interests to
convert to limited partnership interests.  The taxpayer then
disclaimed all of the decedent's partnership interests in the
residuary estate passing to the taxpayer.  The IRS held that
the taxpayer's exercise, as executor, of the estate's voting
power to elect the taxpayer as general partner served as an
acceptance of the limited partnership interests passing
under the residuary estate.  Therefore, the disclaimer was
untimely because the taxpayer had already received the
beneficial use of the property disclaimed.  Ltr. R u l .
9123003, Feb. 14, 1991.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER
TAX.  The U.S. beneficiaries of a foreign trust transferred
the trust corpus assets to the United States and appointed a
U.S. trustee.  The original trust became irrevocable upon
the deaths of the grantors prior to 1985.  The new U.S.
trusts made changes in (1) the powers of the trustee to
invest and sell trust assets, (2) the investment policy of
the trusts, (3) the governing law, (4) the inalienability of
some trust property, and (5) other administrative
provisions.  The new trusts also allowed the beneficiaries
to make additions to trust corpus.  The IRS ruled that the
new U.S. trusts were not subject to GSTT except to the
extent additions were made to the trusts. Ltr. R u l .
9121059, Feb. 27, 1991.
The two beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
established in 1971 divided the trust into two equal trusts
with the same distribution and remainder provisions as the
original trust.  The IRS ruled that the separate trusts were
not subject to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9122027, Feb. 2 8 ,
1991 .
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In order to reduce administrative costs, two trusts
established in 1974 were merged with the provisions of the
trusts unchanged as to income rights and successor
beneficiaries.  The IRS ruled that the merger would not
result in any gain to the trusts nor subject the trusts to
GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9123041, March 12, 1991.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent
bequeathed assets to a valid QTIP trust and the executor
proposed to split the QTIP trust into two trusts and make
the Section 2654(b) "reverse QTIP" election as to one of
the trusts.  The IRS ruled that the "reverse QTIP" election
was allowed.  Ltr. Rul. 9122071, March 6, 1991.
The taxpayer's will established three trusts, (1) a family
trust funded with assets, the value, for estate tax purposes,
of which was determined by the amount which could pass
free of federal estate tax after application of the marital and
charitable deductions, (2) a GSTT trust funded with
property having a value equal to the taxpayer's remaining
GSTT exemption, and (3) a marital trust which qualified as
QTIP.  The taxpayer held a promissory note and reported
gain on the note on the installment method.  The
taxpayer's will provided the executor with the authority to
distribute the note directly to the surviving spouse or to
one of the trusts.  The IRS ruled that distribution of the
installment note directly to the surviving spouse or to the
GSTT or marital trusts would qualify the note for the
marital deduction.  The IRS also ruled that the distribution
of the installment note to the family trust or GSTT trust
would cause recognition of the deferred gain but that
distribution of the note to the marital trust or directly to
the surviving spouse would not cause recognition of
deferred gain.  The IRS stated that gain is accelerated on
installment obligations distributed under pecuniary
bequests if either the estate tax values or date of
distribution values are used in determining the bequests.
Ltr. Rul. 9123036, March 12, 1991.
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT.  The taxpayer
was a beneficiary of a trust established in 1937, and in
1943 the taxpayer relinquished a portion of a general power
of appointment over trust corpus such that the taxpayer
held only a specific power to appoint trust corpus to
family members.  The taxpayer's will appointed trust
property in trust to the taxpayer's children and also created
specific powers of appointment for the trust beneficiaries.
The IRS ruled that the release of a portion of the power of
appointment in 1943 did not affect the date of creation of
the power of appointment in 1937.  The IRS also ruled
that the creation of additional powers of appointment in
the exercise of the power of appointment would not cause
the trust property to be included in the taxpayer's gross
estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9121011, Feb. 21, 1991.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  When the
decedent died in 1977, the decedent's farmland was cash
rented to a cousin and the qualified heir to the land, the
decedent's spouse, continued to cash rent the land to the
cousin after the decedent's death.  The executor did not
make the special use valuation election.  The continued
cash lease, under the law at that time, would have caused
immediate recapture.  In 1988 TAMRA amended the
special use valuation provisions to allow the cash lease of
a surviving spouse to a family member as a qualified use.
The estate argued that the amendment and its retroactive
effective date to 1976 allowed the estate to make the
special use valuation election which was prevented in
1977.  The IRS ruled that the amendment applied only to
estates in which the special use valuation election was
made and the property subsequently cash leased by the
surviving spouse.  The IRS noted that the TAMRA
amendment did not provide for late elections.  Ltr. R u l .
9122004, Feb. 21, 1991.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  In a split from
recent Tax Court decisions (see Vol 1. p 131 and Vol 2, p.
103), a federal district court, in 1988, held that the IRS
may not revalue gifts for estate tax purposes after the
statute of limitations has run on the assessment of gift tax
on those gifts, even though the statute of limitations has
not run on assessment of the estate tax.  Boatmen's
First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. U.S., 91 -1
U.S Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,795 (W.D. M o .
1988) .
TRUSTS .  The decedent had established an
irrevocable trust with the decedent and a disinterested party
as trustees and the decedent's surviving spouse as lifetime
income beneficiary.  The trustees had the power to
distribute trust principal to the beneficiary to provide for
the beneficiary's care, support, maintenance and health,
taking into consideration the beneficiary's other means of
income.  The IRS ruled that because the principal of the
trust could have been distributed in satisfaction of the
decedent's obligation of support of the surviving spouse
during the decedent's lifetime, the trust property was
included in the decedent's gross estate.  The IRS noted that
it was irrelevant to the issue involved that none of the
trust property was ever distributed in satisfaction of the
decedent's obligation to the spouse.  Ltr. R u l .
9122005, Feb. 27, 1991.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS.  The taxpayers were not allowed a bad
debt deduction for amounts lent to their son's  business
partner where the taxpayers knew the loan was a bad
investment and made the loan to protect their son's interest
in the partnership.  A theft loss deduction was also not
allowed because the money lent was used for the purposes
for which it was lent and some money had been repaid
before the business went bankrupt.  Doneff v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-253.
  C CORPORATIONS  
EMPLOYEE.  The taxpayer was an accountant and the
sole shareholder, president and director of a C corporation
for which the taxpayer performed accounting services to
the public.  The taxpayer generally commingled the
corporation and personal funds and expenses.  The court
held that the taxpayer was a common law and statutory
employee of the corporation and was liable for failure of
the corporation to withhold and pay federal employment
taxes.  Darrell Harris, Inc. v. U.S., 91-1 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,271 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
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REORGANIZATION.  A cattle ranch corporation was
reorganized into two corporations in order to avoid disputes
between the shareholders.  The IRS ruled that the
reorganization qualified as a "type D," Section 368(a)(1)(D)
reorganization with carryover of basis and holding periods
for the assets.  Ltr. Rul. 9122058, March 5, 1991.
CAPITAL ASSETS .  The taxpayer was a
corporation which owned a large number of convenience
stores, many of which also included a gas station.  In an
attempt to insure a steady supply of gasoline for these
stores, the taxpayer purchased 12.3 percent of the stock of
an oil and gas exploration corporation.  The taxpayer's
public and shareholder statements and public filings stated
that the stock purchase and ownership were for investment
purposes and that the taxpayer would not purchase any oil
or gas from the corporation, in order for the oil and gas
corporation to retain its income tax depletion allowances.
However, the taxpayer intended to use the corporation's oil
as barter to obtain gasoline from other companies if the
supply of gasoline from its regular suppliers were ever
curtailed.  The taxpayer was forced to sell the stock of the
oil and gas exploration corporation when the corporation
filed for bankruptcy, and the taxpayer claimed the loss of
value of the stock as an ordinary loss.  The court held that
the ownership of the stock had the requisite "close
connection" with the taxpayer's trade or business to qualify
for the inventory exception of I.R.C. § 1221(1).  The
court looked beyond the taxpayer's public statements and
securities filings to find that the purchase of the stock was
primarily made to insure a steady source of gasoline for the
taxpayer's convenience stores.  The Circle K Corp. v .
U.S., 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 2 6 0
(Cls. Ct. 1991).
CASUALTY LOSSES .  The IRS has announced
the areas of Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma and
Texas which have been declared disaster areas for April
1991 in which taxpayers suffering casualty losses from the
disasters may make the election under I.R.C. § 165(i).
Ann. 91-84, I.R.B. 1991-23, 34.
CLOSING AGREEMENTS.  The taxpayer entered
into a closing agreement with the IRS for income tax
liability.  The agreement contained a provision added by
the taxpayer that the agreement pertained solely to
determination of the taxable income of the taxpayer for
1984.  The additional language was intended by the
taxpayer to limit the liability of the taxpayer for 1984
taxes.  The IRS later assessed restricted interest under
I.R.C. § 6601(d) and the taxpayer argued that the IRS had
waived such interest by the agreement.  The court held that
the IRS was not barred by the closing agreement because
the agreement made no specific mention of interest or
penalties; therefore, the IRS had not waived the later
assessment of restricted interest.  In re  Spendthrift
Farms, Inc., 931 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1991).
DEPRECIATION.  The adjusted basis of two
windfarms purchased by the taxpayer was held to be the
purchase price of the farms.  The basis was not reduced by
the amount of general business credits the taxpayer
expected to receive from ownership of the farms because
the purchase price was reached in arm's length negotiations
and the appraisals of the taxpayer's expert witness were
found to be correct.  Van Duzer v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1991-249.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING.  The taxpayer
sold a business in 1986 on the installment method and
reported the gain on the installment method on the 1986
tax return.  However, in 1987, the buyer resold the
business and paid the taxpayer the full amount.  The
taxpayer then decided that an election out of the
installment method would have saved tax and applied for a
revocation of the election to use installment reporting of
gain from the sale.  The IRS denied the application.  Ltr.
Rul. 9121044, Feb. 25, 1991.
The taxpayers purchased property under a leasehold
condemnation proceeding.  The sales contract was a
revocable application to purchase the land.  When the
taxpayer paid for the purchase, an amount characterized as
"blight of summons damages" under Hawaii law was added
to the principal purchase price.  The taxpayers argued that
the additional amount was deductible as interest.  The court
held that the amount was not deductible as interest because
the principal amount was contingent where the taxpayer
could revoke the purchase application without penalty and
the principal amount was not fixed at the time the
additional amount began to accrue.  Noguchi v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-227; Peterson v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-228.
  PARTNERSHIPS  
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  A partnership
was not subject to Sections 6221-6223 because the
partnership began operations prior to September 3, 1982,
where the capital contributions and major operating assets
were acquired before that date.  Wolf v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1991-212.
DEDUCTIONS.  The taxpayers invested in a
partnership which was adjudicated to lack a profit motive
in its business operations.  The taxpayers argued that their
investment in the partnership had the requisite profit
motive, but the court held that the determination of profit
motive was made at the partnership level; thus, the
taxpayers were denied business expense deductions from
their investment in the partnership.  The court held that
the taxpayers should not be assessed the 10 percent penalty
for substantial understatement of income tax because the
taxpayers were not sophisticated investors and had relied on
trusted professional advice for the deductibility of the
expenses.  Vorshek v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,258 (9th Cir. 1991).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  The taxpayers
were limited partners in a partnership which had been
discharged from indebtedness.  Because the partnership was
insolvent at the time of the discharge of indebtedness, the
court held that, under the insolvency exception available in
1977, the partnership was not subject to discharge of
indebtedness income, even though the taxpayers were
solvent.  The court also held that the taxpayers were not
entitled to an increase in the basis of their partnership
interests from the discharge of the indebtedness.  Est. o f
Newman v. Comm'r, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
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(CCH) § 50,281 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'g  T . C .
Memo. 1990-230.
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE.  The taxpayer was a partner
entitled to 25 percent of the partnership profits and losses.
During the taxable year involved, the taxpayer sought
rescission of the taxpayer's contribution to the partnership.
The court held that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct the
taxpayer's share of partnership losses because the
rescission suit did not seek recovery for the taxpayer's
share of partnership losses.  Garcia v. Comm'r, 9 6
T.C. No. 36 (1991).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON .  The debtor was the
daughter of the owner of a construction corporation and
was made corporate secretary and vice-president.  The
debtor was employed as the office manager and had access
to the corporate accounting and bookkeeping system on a
computer.  The debtor had check writing authority and
signed over 80 percent of the payroll checks and 25-50
percent of all corporate checks.  The debtor had access to
information as to the payment of withholding taxes and
signed checks paying other creditors while knowing that
employment taxes were unpaid.  The court held that the
debtor was a responsible person subject to the 100 percent
penalty under I.R.C. § 6672.  In re  Sims, 126 B . R .
618 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
RETURNS.  The IRS has issued revised Form 2848,
Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative, and
new Form 8821, Tax Information Authorization, to be
used after July 1, 1991.  Form 2828-D is now obsolete.
Ann. 91-80, I.R.B. 1991-22, 48.
  S CORPORATIONS  
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  An S
corporation with four shareholders was held not exempt
from the unified audit and litigation procedures for the
taxable year 1984 because the taxable year occurred prior to
the effective date of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6241-1T(c)
which allows exemption for small S corporations.
Eastern States Casualty Agency, Inc. v .
Comm'r, 96 T.C. No. 35 (1991).
CLASS OF STOCK.  An S corporation issued 300
shares to the corporation's president, 200 from stock
redeemed from other shareholders and 100 of newly issued
nonvoting common stock.  The president owned the stock
subject to restrictions on transfer of the stock and subject
to the continuing employment of the president by the
corporation.  The stock vested in the president when the
president retired, became disabled or died or the corporation
changed ownership.  The president did not make an
election under Section 83 to treat the stock as vested.  The
IRS ruled that the president's ownership of the stock was
subject to a substantial risk of foreclosure, was
substantially nonvested and was not a second class of
stock.  Ltr. Rul. 9121037, Feb. 25, 1991.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME.  An S
corporation with C corporation earnings and profits
operated a storage facility in which the corporation stored
files and business goods for other companies.  The
corporation also picked up and delivered the materials and
kept inventory records for the clients.  The IRS ruled that
income from the facility was not passive investment
income because the corporation provided significant
services in relation to the rental of the facility.  Ltr.
Rul. 9122055, March 5, 1991.
TERMINATION.  In an attempt to equalize the two
shareholders' voting rights, an S corporation amended its
articles of incorporation to provide for two classes of stock
with the only intended difference to be the voting rights of
the stock.  However, the amendments erroneously included
some differences in liquidation and dividend rights,
resulting in termination of the S corporation status.  The
amendments where changed as soon as the termination was
discovered and the IRS ruled that the termination was
waived because it was inadvertent.  Ltr. R u l .
9122057, March 5, 1991.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  The IRS has
issued proposed regulations extending the statute of
limitations on collections after assessment from six to ten
years as provided by RRA 1990.  The proposed regulations
also provide that if a timely proceeding in court for
collection of a tax is commenced, the period of limitations
on levy is extended until the liability or a judgment arising
out of the liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable.
56 Fed. Reg. 27928 (June 18, 1991).  
LANDOWNER LIABILITY
PIPELINE.  The defendant landscaping company had
contracted with a YMCA for the removal of mature trees
from the YMCA's camp woods.  During the removal of
one of the trees, the machinery ruptured a gasoline pipeline
operated by the plaintiff.  The defendant pled immunity
from liability under Minn. Stat. § 1161.07 which provided
immunity for damage to a pipeline by a landowner while
engaged in the ordinary conduct of agricultural operations.
The court held that the removal of the trees was in the
nature of excavating and not agricultural operations where
the trees were not grown for harvest.  Amoco Pipeline
v. Minn. Valley Landscaping, 467 N.W.2d 3 5 1
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
NEGLIGENCE
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.  After the
plaintiff's tractor was damaged by the defendant's error in
putting gasoline in the plaintiff's diesel fuel tanks, the
defendant sent the plaintiff a check for the repairs with
"Full, Final Settlement for Damage to Tractor" written on
the front.  The court held that the repair bill was not a
liquidated debt because the defendant contested the
remainder of the repair bill; therefore, the debt could be
subject to an accord and satisfaction.  The court reversed
the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant,
however, because an issue of fact remained as to whether
the plaintiff knew or should have known that the check
was intended as an accord and satisfaction of the defendant's
liability for the fuel error.  Seidler v. Vaughn O i l
Co., 468 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
PARTNERSHIPS
EXISTENCE OF PARTNERSHIP.  The
defendants contributed money toward the purchase of a
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ranch by two persons who had formed a partnership.  The
defendants were to become limited partners of a partnership
formed to own the land and operate the ranch.  After the
two persons failed to make the first two payments on the
land sales contract, the sellers brought an action for
specific performance and damages against the defendants,
claiming that the defendants were liable as partners with
the buyers.  The court held that the defendants were not
liable on the sales contract as partners or as joint venturers
because the defendants had no control over the purchase of
the ranch.  In addition, the court held that the buyers were
not agents of the defendants.  Weingart v. C & W
Taylor Partnership, 809 P.2d 576 (Mont.
1991) .
PROPERTY
FENCES .  The plaintiff had petitioned the county
fenceviewers to issue an order requiring the defendant to fix
and maintain a partition fence which bordered the parties'
properties.  The disputed portion of the fence ran through a
portion of the defendant's property where the defendant
owned several acres on both sides of the fence.  The court
held that the fence was not a partition fence subject to the
fenceviewers' jurisdiction because the same owner owned
property on more than a few feet on both sides of the
fence.  Kundel Farms v. Vir-Jo Farms, Inc., 4 6 7
N.W.2d 291 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
DAMS .  The defendant had altered a dam on a creek
running through the defendant's and plaintiff's property
such that the flow of water was decreased, especially during
drier years.  The defendant changed the dam to increase the
area of a marsh behind the dam which the defendant rented
to hunters.  The plaintiff used the water for irrigation of
crops and livestock watering.  The court held that the
plaintiff's natural use of the stream took precedence over
the defendant's artificial use and ordered the defendant to
restore the dam to its original condition.  Kundel Farms




 PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST.
A creditor lent the debtor money so that the debtor could
complete some existing service contracts.  At the time of
the loan, the debtor's property was subject to a valid federal
tax lien.  The creditor argued that the loan was a purchase
money obligation because the money enabled the debtor to
acquire assets.  The court held that the loan was not a
purchase money obligation because the money was used
for existing contracts which were already property of the
debtor and subject to the tax lien.  The court stated that the
money was essentially used for the operation of the
debtor's business and not the purchase of additional assets.
First Interstate Bank of Utah v. I.R.S., 9 3 0
F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
GRASSHOPPERS .  In response to a major
infestation of grasshoppers, the plaintiffs were ordered to
spray their farmland.  Under Minn. Stat. §§ 18.0223-.0227
landowners who failed to spray their land under such an
order would have their land sprayed by the county with the
costs assessed to the landowner and the landowner would
be guilty of a misdemeanor.  The spraying order and
misdemeanor charge could be challenged after the spraying
was completed.  The plaintiff's challenged the law as
violating the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
(MERA) and as violating constitutional due process
because a hearing was not available until after they would
be guilty of a misdemeanor.  The court held that the
grasshopper spraying provisions did not violate the MERA
because MERA did not apply to acts of the state
department of agriculture which had the responsibility of
carrying out the grasshopper spraying.  The court also held
that the violation of due process was not unconstitutional
because the grasshopper infestation was a public
emergency justifying the loss of due process.  The court
cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) for
this exception to the due process right and noted that in
Jacobson, the plaintiff was not allowed a post-violation
hearing to challenge the governmental order but that the
landowners were allowed a post-conviction hearing in this
case.  Holte v. State, 467 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
JOURNAL ARTICLES
The San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review premier
issue contains the following articles:
J. Heron, Jr. and D. Friedman, "New Challenges for
California Agriculture in World Export Markets."
M. McGinnis, "A Carrot or a Stick?  Promoting Water
Conservation in Arizona Agriculture."
Comment, "Migrant Farmworkers: The Legislature
Giveth and Taketh Away."
Comment, "To Guarantee or to Protect?  Fifty Years of
Dairy Subsidies."
Comment, "Warning!  Preemption May be Hazardous
to Plaintiff Pesticide Cases."
In the next issue:
Divisive Corporate
Reorganizations
by Neil E. Harl







EMPLOYEE STATUS.  The plaintiff was a farrier
who shoed horses for various clients.  The plaintiff was
injured by a kick from a horse while shoeing one of three
horses for the defendant.  The plaintiff sought workers'
compensation for the injuries because the work was done
under the control of the defendant.  The court held that the
defendant's instructions on the type of shoeing necessary
for the horse involved were only control over a few matters
necessary for a proper shoeing and were not sufficient
control over the plaintiff's performance of the job to make
the plaintiff an employee.  The court also noted that (1)
the plaintiff's work was limited to only three horses on
one day and that there was no continuing employment
relationship between the parties, (2) the plaintiff was paid
on a per horse basis, (3) the plaintiff provided all essential
farrier tools while the defendant provided only general tools
available on any ranch, and (4) horseshoeing qualifies as an
independent trade.  The court also discussed the effect of
Mont. Stat. § 39-71-401(3)(a) which allows an
independent contractor to elect to be covered by workers'
compensation or elect exemption from the insurance.  The
court held that the plaintiff's failure to make any election
under the statute did not make the plaintiff a statutory
employee for purposes of workers' compensation coverage.
Doig v. Gravely, 809 P.2d 12 (Mont. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
In re  Gushue, 126 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E . D .
Pa. 1991) (bankruptcy tax claims) see p. 100 supra.
Azar Nut Co. v. Comm'r, 931 F.2d 314 (5th
Cir. 1991) (capital assets), see p. 103 supra.
Schumacher v. U.S., 931 F.2d 650 (10th
Cir. 1991) (investment tax credit), see p. 104 supra.
Andrews v. Comm'r, 931 F.2d 132 (1st Cir .
1991) (travel expenses), see p. 95 supra.
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